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TRANSCRIPT OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON
INSIDER TRADING: LAW, POLICY, AND
THEORY AFTER O'HAGAN*
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: I am Larry Cunningham,
professor of law here at Cardozo and the Director of the Heyman
Center on Corporate Governance, and I am delighted to welcome
all of you here to the program, "Insider Trading: Law, Policy and
Theory After O'Hagan."' The O'Hagan case marked the first time
in some seventeen years that the United States Supreme Court has
spoken as a court on the murky contours of insider trading law.
For that reason alone, the Court's opinion is important. It is also
important since it will strongly influence the direction and fabric of
insider trading law in the future. Another reason why it is impor-
tant is that, as with many momentous opinions, it leaves several
important questions unanswered.
Many scholars around the country have begun to try to help
people understand the case. Such scholars, including a couple of
our panelists and we at Cardozo, also wanted to offer a forum to
contribute to the dialogue on this subject, which is very likely to
continue for many years to come.
We want to thank our distinguished group of guests at the ta-
ble, as well as people in the audience. I also want to acknowledge
The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Govern-
ance for generously supporting this discussion, as well as many
other activities here at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I
also personally want to thank the Cardozo Law Review for co-
sponsoring the event and, in particular, Marcy Rosenbaum for
helping to organize it.
Like the conversations at the end of the old David Brinkley's
* This is an edited version of the transcript of the Roundtable, entitled Insider Trad-
ing: Law, Policy, and Theory After O'Hagan, held on November 5, 1997 at the Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law. Participants included Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Professor Marcel Kahan, New York University
School of Law; Professor Roberta S. Karmel, Brooklyn Law School; Daniel J. Kramer,
Esq., Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP; Arthur F. Mathews, Esq., Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering;
and The Honorable Ralph K. Winter, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit. Some participants have more fully incorporated their statements in Articles included
in this issues. For articles arising from this symposium, see Symposium, Insider Trading:
Law, Policy, and Theory After O'Hagan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1998).
1 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
This Week show, this program is unrehearsed, unscripted and un-
edited. I will start with a brief overview and background of insider
trading and a brief recitation of the facts of the O'Hagan case. I
will then try to stir up some discussion among the panelists, which
will not be hard to do judging by the conversations I overheard
some of them having a few moments ago.
First, let me introduce the panelists on my far right. Dan
Kramer, one of the scholars I mentioned, has written a piece called
A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading with
his partner, David Brodsky. They are with the firm of Schulte
Roth & Zabel LLP, here in New York.
Next to him is Judge Ralph Winter of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Winter is also a law pro-
fessor at Yale Law School who teaches corporations and insider
trading and has written one important opinion, at least, involving
insider trading,3 as well as many other important opinions. For my
students in the audience, they are well aware of the famous Win-
ter-Cary debate4 that is the organizing principle of my corporations
class.
To my immediate right is Professor Roberta Karmel. She is
another scholar who has written substantially on the subject of in-
sider trading, including a forthcoming piece called Outsider Trad-
ing on Confidential Information: A Breach in Search of Duty.'
Professor Karmel is on the faculty at Brooklyn Law School and is
also of counsel for the firm of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, here in
New York.
To my left is Professor Marcel Kahan who is on the faculty at
New York University Law School and was visiting, this year, at
Columbia Law School. He has written many important articles on
a wide variety of subjects relating to corporate law and securities
2 David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory
of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 41 (1998).
3 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571-88 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
4 Professor Cary argues that Delaware led a "race for the bottom" to be the leading
state of incorporation for large corporations by reducing protections for shareholders. See
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974). By contrast, Judge Winter argues that, if Delaware allows management to
eliminate shareholder protections, the earnings of such companies will be lower than those
of similar corporations in shareholder-friendly states. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
5 Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information: A Breach in




Finally, on my far left is Art Mathews who is a partner at the
law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington, D.C., and
who, among other things, filed an amicus brief in the O'Hagan
case.
First, a little background. Insider trading is a term of art gen-
erally meaning, or referring to, unlawful trading by someone,
whether or not the person is a true corporate insider, possessing
material, nonpublic information about publicly traded securities.
What makes insider trading unlawful? Congress has never defined
with precision the term insider trading. The chief source of law
governing the subject consists of judicial applications of the gen-
eral anti-fraud provisions set out in section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "'34 Act"), 7 and SEC Rule 10b-58
("Rule 10b-5") of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). That section of the '34 Act makes it unlawful "to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity[,] ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."9
Rule 10b-5 is substantially to the same effect.
In early interpretations of these provisions, the duty to abstain
from trading on material, nonpublic information, or to disclose it,
principally was rooted in traditional state common law and corpo-
rate fiduciary duties of directors, officers, and controlling share-
holders. That duty could be extended to outsiders, if the informa-
tion was intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
if it would be inherently unfair for its possessor to use it when it
was unavailable to other market participants. Usually, this ap-
proach was understood to cover so-called "temporary insiders,"
such as attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, and others
privy to such information in the course of representation.
The duty to abstain or disclose instead could have been an-
chored in a far more general ground of a parity of information ra-
tionale to reflect the justifiable expectation of the securities mar-
ketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information. These alternative
rationales were rejected, however, by the Supreme Court in Chi-
6 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-
Based Securities Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509 (1997).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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arella,10 a 1980 case, and Dirks," a 1983 case. Instead, both of
these cases insisted on the presence of some duty arising from a fi-
duciary-like relationship, seemingly one between the person trad-
ing and the subject corporation's shareholders. This is a key point
that the O'Hagan case relaxes.
Alternatively, the duty instead could arise from a middle
ground. It could be imposed on any person, whether traditional
corporate insiders, temporary insiders, or outsiders who misappro-
priate non-public information, whether from the shareholders of
the subject company or others. This rationale, or position, was
first articulated by Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion in
Chiarella, and it was later adopted by most, but not all, circuit
courts. This position was finally approved by the Supreme Court
in O'Hagan, which is the centerpiece of our discussion. Now, let
me just give a brief recitation of the facts and then invite the pan-
elists to offer their impression of the case.
As I emphasized, O'Hagan is an outsider trading case. James
O'Hagan was an outsider. He was a partner in a private law firm,
which was retained by Grand Met, in July 1988, in connection with
Grand Met's claimed takeover of Pillsbury. 2 Although O'Hagan
was not one of the lawyers on the deal, he learned about the deal
from his law firm partners and, on that knowledge, bought Pills-
bury stock and bought options to buy Pillsbury stock. 3
A few months later, in October, Grand Met publicly an-
nounced its tender offer for Pillsbury, and Pillsbury's stock rose
substantially. O'Hagan sold his stock and his options and gener-
ated a profit of over four million dollars. The SEC investigated,
charged, and indicted him on various charges, the most relevant
violations being that of section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5
thereunder, as well as SEC Rule 14e-3 ("Rule 14e-3"), 14 which is a
general prohibition against trading on material, nonpublic infor-
mation relating to a tender offer.
A jury convicted O'Hagan on all counts. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that nei-
ther section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 thereunder could be grounded in
this misappropriation theory, which Chief Justice Burger had ini-
tially articulated in the Chiarella dissent. The Eighth Circuit also
10 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
11 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
12 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2205 (1997).
13 See id.
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1998); see O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
15 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-40.
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reversed on the 14e-3 conviction on the ground that the SEC did
not have the power to promulgate that rule.16
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg and over the dissenting opinions of
Justices Thomas and Scalia.17 The majority opinion upholds the
misappropriation theory and announces that "[a] person who
trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential informa-
tion misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of
the information, may be held liable for violating [section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5."'18 The Court also held that the SEC did have the
authority to promulgate Rule 14e-3, which is the general prohibi-
tion against trading in connection with tender offers. 9 O'Hagan
went to jail and there he sits.
A number of issues arise from a reading of this opinion, both
in terms of the opinion's conceptual soundness, as well as in terms
of thinking about its meaning for the development of insider trad-
ing law as we move forward. To organize the discussion, I would
like to concentrate, principally, on the 10(b) issues and save the
14e-3 issues for the end, if we have time. We can roughly divide
the 10(b) issues according to the subtitle of the conference, "Law,
Policy, and Theory," although there will obviously be some over-
lap. Before we discuss particular issues, perhaps we can start by
going around the table and asking each of the panelists to say, in a
minute or two, what they think of the opinion. We will start with
Professor Kahan.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: This is an opinion that is easy to
criticize, and I am sure that in the course of the evening I will not
be able to resist the temptation to criticize certain aspects of the
opinion. However, Justice Ginsburg had a difficult task, given the
prior precedent, the wording of the statute, and the policy consid-
erations in play. I do not think she did a perfect job, but I think
she did an adequate job. I like the misappropriation theory. I
think she narrowed it somewhat from the way it was construed by
the circuit courts, but she did so in a way that is probably not very
relevant. But, overall, I think she did a good job in writing the
opinion and will get to the weaknesses later on.
16 See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,627 (1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
17 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
18 Id. at 2202.
19 Id. at 2217-18.
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PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Art, do you agree with
that? What is your overall impression?
MR. MATHEWS: I think you can look at the O'Hagan case
from two different perspectives. If you look at it as only a securi-
ties law case, it is a very important victory for the SEC and the
Department of Justice. I am talking about the 10b-5 aspect of it,
not the 14e-3. I happen to think that the case is wrongly decided
as to 10b-5. It was rightly decided as to 14e-3. I look at the case,
jurisprudentially, not as a securities case, but as a traditional
criminal law case. I think the majority of the Supreme Court com-
pletely missed the boat jurisprudentially. Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
and the others who joined her in the majority, really gave no
treatment to the fact that their decision was letting the courts
manufacture a crime rather than having Congress legislate a crime.
I think that violates the separation of powers concept and it vio-
lates other doctrines of criminal law. If you look back historically,
it is really interesting.
I was the head of the criminal section of the SEC in the 1960s.
Roberta was at the SEC at the same time I was. In all of the time
that we were at the SEC, there had never been a criminal prosecu-
tion for insider trading. We are talking about the decade of the
1960s. The statute was passed in 1934. If you had asked most SEC
attorneys in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, or 1960s, they would have told
you that you cannot have a criminal prosecution for insider trad-
ing, because Congress never made it a crime. Indeed, in the legis-
lative history of the '34 Act, when Congress compromised and
passed section 16(b), 0 the short selling profit section of the Act, to
take profits away from insiders who trade, Congress specifically
addressed the question of whether or not it should be criminal and
determined not to make insider trading criminal.
So, there was never a criminal prosecution for insider trading
until the Chiarella case in the late 1970s. Also, when the Chiarella
case went up to the Supreme Court and was thrown out, no one
ever made the argument that, I think, should have been made ju-
risprudentially, that insider trading was not a crime. Now, by the
1990s, with the Supreme Court looking at O'Hagan, there were
just so many years of courts dealing with and accepting insider
trading in the criminal context that it was too late to be jurispru-
dentially pure and to look at it the way I think it would have been
20 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
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looked at if the proper arguments were made sooner.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Thank you very much, Art.
Justice Scalia made a variation of that point in his dissenting
opinion in the case. Basically, he said that for prosecution the
criminal law should be quite clear and in this context that it really
is not and that he would have upheld the Eighth Circuit. Dan, do
you have a brief impression of the overall case to share?
MR. KRAMER: My view is very much like Art's. I think the
jurisprudence of insider trading is a case of the Court making it up
as it goes along. The misappropriation theory truly is not
grounded in the language of section 10(b) and as a result, in prac-
tice, you are left with a case-by-case determination of just how far
this judge-made theory is going to extend. I think it is very diffi-
cult to predict. It is very unfair, and the solution, in my view, is not
to continue this ad hoc expansion of the law of insider trading, but
rather to kick it back to Congress. Allow Congress to define what
the crime is, or what the violation is, so that we can have more cer-
tainty as to what conduct is prohibited and what conduct is not
prohibited. Then, we can have courts take the lead from Congress
in terms of the scope of prohibited activity, as opposed to what we
have now, which is a lot of uncertainty in a very important area-
an area that often can lead to criminal prosecution.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, Dan. Inciden-
tally, I think Justice Thomas's opinion really was a critique of the
degree to which the misappropriation theory is not anchored in the
text of the statute, which I read to you earlier. I had emphasized
two concepts. First, the activity must be in connection with a secu-
rities transaction. Second, there must be some deception. Like
you, I think Justice Thomas could not really see either of these fac-
tors in the misappropriation theory. Judge Winter, to the extent
that you can, what is your overall impression?
JUDGE WINTER: Well, this seems to be a very anti-
O'Hagan crowd, and, uncharacteristically, I will not go against the
tide. What everyone has said is largely correct and is the product
of history. If you go back to Cady,2' you will see insider trading
requires special access to information that was meant for the
21 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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owner's use. Cady adopted a rule of insider trading with two ele-
ments: a trader's relationship providing special access to corporate
information and the inherent unfairness in trading on public mar-
kets with people who do not have that information. This second
element furnished the fraud or deception that links the prohibition
to 10(b). My court went and took the second aspect, the unfair-
ness of trading with people who do not have the information, to ut-
terly absurd lengths. In its opinion in Chiarella,22 the Second Cir-
cuit held that everyone has to have the same information, which is
really a crazy idea. The Supreme Court then, in Chiarella and
Dirks, spoke of the requirement about trading, but said that the
violation was not in the trading. What they did then was to utterly
sever the insider trading from 10(b). Until that moment, everyone
had thought the fraud or the deception had to be in the trading,
but now that was no longer the case. Well, once you have severed
illegal insider trading from fraud and 10(b), all you have is misuse
of confidential information.
Once you get to that point, which is where we were after
Dirks, O'Hagan does not go much further. All O'Hagan says is
that it does not matter whether the information was the property
of the corporation whose shares were traded. I think that is all it
says. That is not a big step. The reason why everyone is critical of
Justice Ginsburg, which is somewhat unfair, is because she was
dealt a hand with these precedents that severed insider trading
from fraud. She had to try, as she heroically attempted, to connect
it back, but she failed because you cannot connect it back. She had
to come up with this theory that there is a duty to disclose.
The real danger of O'Hagan, therefore, is that it will not be
limited to insider trading. She found a 10(b) violation in a situa-
tion in which you can violate 10(b) even though there was no duty
to speak and you did not speak. The case could now be cited for
that proposition in areas not involving insider trading. Given the
moralistic and self-righteous way that courts deal with these issues,
I am more fearful about O'Hagan going beyond insider or outsider
trading than I am as to what it did, given where we were before the
decision.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: So, in the end, you may be
as critical of O'Hagan as the other panelists, although for different
reasons. Professor Karmel, what is your opinion?
22 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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PROFESSOR KARMEL: Well, it is hard to be last in this
discussion. I would say that in some ways I agree with what each
of the prior speakers has said. Let me put a little bit of a gloss on
that view. Politically and pragmatically, the O'Hagan decision was
correct in that it would have been very difficult for the court to de-
cide the case the way in which the circuit court decided it, because
of the facts. Here was a lawyer, who stole information from his
law firm and client and made several million dollars. Also, he
stole the money because he had been stealing from other clients
and he needed to pay them back. O'Hagan was a very unattractive
defendant. Also, the case involved a crime, insider trading, which
is illegal everywhere that there are mature capital markets and the
laws of other countries are based on their presumptions about the
law of the United States. It would have been anomalous in the ex-
treme for the U.S. to abruptly find that it did not have a law
against trading on inside information in circumstances such as this.
So, I think the decision probably had to come out this way,
but the Court was in a box that had been created by its own prior
decisions, particularly Chiarella and Dirks. Those cases rejected
the idea that persons who come into the possession of inside in-
formation and then trade on it owe a duty to the marketplace be-
cause, according to the Court, there has to be a breach of a par-
ticular fiduciary duty between two people. Justice Ginsburg really
had a problem as to how to come out in favor of the government
without saying the court was overruling Chiarella or Dirks. There-
fore, the logic of the decision is necessarily extremely strained.
All of the blame for this decision does not really belong to the
Supreme Court, but should be spread around. Congress has de-
clined to define insider trading, even though it had the opportu-
nity. During the 1980s, Congress twice amended the securities
laws and increased the sanctions for insider trading, both civil and
otherwise, without ever defining this wrong. I would go back,
however, and put the blame on the SEC. The SEC, as Art
Mathews explained, had never tried to prosecute anybody crimi-
nally for the crime of insider trading until fairly late in the game.
Indeed, until the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided the Texas Gulf Sulphur case13 in the mid-1960s,
there was no court decision approving this theory, even with re-
gard to what is called classic insider trading, which is trading on in-
23 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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side information by officers and directors of corporations.
I have to say, when I was on the staff of the SEC in the 1960s,
I had my doubts that the SEC was going to win the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case. It seemed to me that it was a bit of a stretch, given
the language of 10b-5. However, it became the law, and the SEC
began to expand it. The SEC certainly could have defined insider
trading by rule. It could have gone to Congress and asked for a
definition of insider trading. It did not do either. Indeed, the SEC
always took the position that defining insider trading would simply
be a blueprint for fraud and clever and devious people could get
around any definition that it devised. So, the SEC opposed efforts
to define insider trading.
Moreover, other than the Cady rationale that insider trading
is unfair, the SEC has never tried to come up with a real policy jus-
tification for insider trading. I have some of my own theories
about that, which I think we may get to later on in the discussion.
For now, I will say something about the problem arising from
the criminality of insider trading. I think that the fact that insider
trading and 10b-5 cases are generally both civil and criminal is part
of what gets the government and the courts into a problematic
situation. On the one hand, there are 10b-5 cases quite properly
saying that the securities laws are broad remedial statutes and
should be broadly construed. That is fine in a civil case. On the
other hand, when you have the same statute and the same lan-
guage in a criminal case, courts are confronted with the doctrine
that criminal statutes are not supposed to be construed as broad
remedial statutes. They are supposed to be construed strictly. So,
I think this is what leads to the problem that we are discussing to-
night.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: The defects of the O'Hagan case
cannot be blamed entirely on Justice Ginsburg. She did a valiant
job to come up with a principled decision, but I think in the end
she failed because it was impossible under the circumstances.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Thanks. Professor Kahan?
PROFESSOR KAHAN: Since I seem to be the lead de-
fender of the O'Hagan decision tonight, let me just explain why I
think it is a pretty good opinion. I agree that Justice Ginsburg had
[Vol. 20:7
TRANSCRIPT OF ROUNDTABLE
some difficult precedents and a difficult statute to work with, but I
think she did a good job. Essentially, I think so for three reasons.
First, I believe that most of the trading that is going to be
clearly illegal under the rationale of the O'Hagan decision is not
socially desirable. That is definitely true for O'Hagan himself. I
do not think that any of the panelists believe that O'Hagan should
have traded on this information. So, I do not think we are killing
off trading that we want to happen. In fact, I think we are killing
off trading that we do not want to happen.
Second, it is true that the opinion leaves a lot of gray areas.
When I teach my corporations course and discuss insider trading, I
spend a lot of time on these gray areas, and I present a lot of fancy
hypotheticals. Maybe even more fancy than some of the hy-
potheticals in the opinion. But, I do not believe that a lot of actual
trading happens in these gray areas. Most of the trading that oc-
curs is either clearly legal or clearly illegal. Conceptually, there
are a lot of gray areas but, practically, these gray areas are not ter-
ribly significant, and I am not very troubled by them. I think the
opinion cuts down on what these gray areas are. Maybe not al-
ways in the way I would have, but it clarifies the law a little bit.
The best argument against the case, as Art stated earlier, is
that this is a criminal case and it is not right for courts to define
crimes out of fresh clothes. I am sympathetic to that pain. I think
that criminal prosecutions under 10b-5 for insider trading ought to
be reserved and I think that, for the most part, they are reserved
for trading that is egregious where, on the basis of past precedents,
the public has sufficient notice to know that what is going on is
criminal. This may not have been true for Chiarella, but I think it
was true for O'Hagan, and I think it is true for most of the criminal
cases.
I also want to say that all violations of the securities laws are
potentially criminal, but insider trading seems to be the one area
where we see a lot of criminal prosecutions. The reason is that you
can make a lot of money on insider trading, and thus you need a
strong deterrent. So, from a policy perspective, I definitely favor
criminal liability for insider trading. But, I also think that as we go
closer to the border I would be much happier if the SEC brought
several civil cases to define the law. This is generally done, but not
always. To the extent that it is not done, I would like it to be done
and I think this goes at least some way to addressing the concerns
of some of my co-panelists.
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JUDGE WINTER: In listening to you, Professor Kahan, I
am not at all comforted by the fact that the insider trading cases
that have gone to the Supreme Court were all cases where some-
body was doing something wrong. I happen to agree with that.
But, in criminal law, to have a crime that is not defined, either in
terms of what it is or what the rationale is for its being illegal, in-
vites prosecutorial misconduct. Also, you are wrong to say that in-
sider trading is all that criminal prosecutions are brought on. The
vague prosecutions in the 1980s were under section 13(d) of the
Williams Act. 4 That was what everybody was pleading to. They
were not pleading to 10(b). I think you really do not address the
fact that under O'Hagan, under all of this, anyone who hears a
rumor and has questions about where it comes from has to worry
about whether it comes from someone who is breaching a fiduciary
obligation.
As you know, one of the things that the students here and
everybody else ought to have in mind is that the SEC cannot bring
a criminal case. We talked about the SEC bringing a criminal case.
The SEC does not bring it. The United States Attorney brings it.
I know of at least one criminal case, which I saw part of, which the
SEC had not wanted to pursue and the United States Attorney
brought. More than that, what happens is that people do not nec-
essarily get indicted, they get squeezed. They get brought in be-
fore grand juries, and they are asked, "where did you hear this,
where did you hear that, and where did you hear the other thing?"
There is a culture within the SEC, which Professor Karmel
mentioned, that it does not want to define things because that will
tell people what is legal and illegal and people will be going
around doing legal things that it decides, after the fact, it does not
want them to do. So, there is this pressure to have this broad law
with all of this discretion, and it seems to me that it is just a big
mistake to use the criminal law this way.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Judge Winter, you men-
tioned the parity of information rationale and the inherent unfair-
ness rationale. Those rationales do not seem to animate Justice
Ginsburg's opinion.
JUDGE WINTER: Well, she does talk about the integrity of
markets.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
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PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes, the integrity of mar-
kets and investor confidence. Investor confidence seems to be the
big theme of her opinion. In what way would prohibitions of this
sort promote investor confidence? I guess that might be the ques-
tion for Marcel.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: When investors trade, they want to
have some confidence that they are trading at a fair price, not at a
price that people have good reason to know is either too high or
too low. If you think that the market is dominated by people who
have much greater access to information than you do, then this re-
duces the liquidity of the market. This is a rationale for the prohi-
bition of insider trading, but it is a rationale that goes too far.
There are trade-offs that need to be made. The trade-offs relate to
providing people with incentives to find information. Under cer-
tain circumstances, if you have information that other. people do
not have, or if you can detect information that other people cannot
acquire, there are good reasons why we want to permit you to
trade on that information. So, when you balance, on the one hand,
the interests in fair markets with little inequality in access to in-
formation and, on the other hand, the need to reward people for
digging up information by permitting them to trade on it, one thing
becomes relatively clear. That is that people who have acquired
information in a way that is illegal, or people who are using infor-
mation that they were given for an improper purpose should not
trade. Their trading inhibits the liquidity of the market without
having any other socially desirable effects.
I think the O'Hagan decision, while not going as far in scope
as I have just outlined, covers this territory to a large extent. If
you have gotten information that was meant for a certain purpose,
namely to assist somebody else in doing something, you cannot use
this information for a different purpose even if the person who
gave it to you could have used it for a different purpose. There
may be reasons why we want to permit the company that was do-
ing the tender offer to engage in insider trading on its knowledge
that it was going to do a tender offer but not let anybody else, who
got this information from the company, use this information to
trade on it.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Can I interrupt there for a
minute, Marcel? Let's take it out of the tender offer context for a
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moment so that we do not have to deal with the 14e-3 situation. If
you say that the owner's information would not be free to trade
on, why could that owner not then have a private contract with a
person, such as O'Hagan, in which that person, under that con-
tract, is free to trade on the information? How would that be dif-
ferent in terms of its impact on investor confidence?
PROFESSOR KAHAN: I do not think it would be different
in terms of its impact on investor confidence. The owner of that
information could have such a contract. I think it is clear after
O'Hagan, and it was clear before O'Hagan, that you can only mis-
appropriate from somebody who is being misappropriated. You
cannot misappropriate from somebody who consents.
By the way, I have never come across any contract of that
sort. Most companies have confidentiality agreements, explicit or
implicit, with their employees. I have not seen any company say-
ing that "I will pay you a lower salary but, in exchange for that,
will let you insider trade on the information." So, the mere fact
that you can have such a contract, given that nobody does, is not a
destructive criticism of the logic, or the doctrinal basis, of the deci-
sion.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes. Maybe the reason
people do not do it is because the state of insider trading law is so
unkind.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: No, I do not think that. My reading
is that it is fairly clear, but maybe some of the other panelists have
a different opinion.
MR. KRAMER: Can I respond to a couple of things that
have been said? This has been very provocative. I find very pro-
vocative a lot of things you are saying, Professor. First of all, when
you defend the O'Hagan decision, you should not ignore the lan-
guage of 10(b). In your statements of why you thought it was a
good decision, I could not help but notice that you omitted any
statement of "it is a good decision because the law requires X."
Ultimately, if you cannot support O'Hagan based on the language
of the statute, then you have a tremendous problem. The second
thing I want to say is that there is no support for the statement that
investor confidence has been destroyed by the lack of misappro-
priation theory, given that the stock market has gone from 4000 to
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8,000 and over half of all Americans now invest in it. I would say
that is pretty good evidence of confidence. There is no more basis
for that statement than there is for the observation that prosecu-
tors behave themselves when determining whether to either prose-
cute under this law or to use it as leverage, as they do every day, in
trying to seek concessions.
A third point is that I do not understand why investor confi-
dence would be shaken by the lack of a misappropriation theory,
but is not shaken if companies are able to disclose this information
selectively to favored people or groups without violating the law. I
do not understand how you can take one position and not the
other. Finally, even if you think this is good policy, why are you
comfortable having the courts develop this policy on a case-by-
case basis with reference to a statute where you cannot determine,
or guess, what the next case result will be based on the language of
the statute. That has to frighten you. It certainly frightens me and
it leads me to believe that if there is going to be a fix, it has got to
be a congressional fix.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: Well, I cannot respond to every-
thing because I do not want to monopolize the discussion. I am
troubled by the lack of relation between 10b-5 and insider trading.
I think this is true for Chiarella insider trading, for Dirks insider
trading, and for all insider trading. So, given that we have a lot of
these cases on the books, the question is not should 10b-5 be used
at all to deal with insider trading. I regard this question as settled.
The question remaining is how far should 10b-5 reach? I do not
think that O'Hagan represents a greater departure from the text of
10b-5 and 10(b) than Dirks and Chiarella did. But, I am troubled.
If I were to design a system of insider trading, I would not say,
"let's adopt Rule 10b-5 and then let the courts work things out."
That would not be my favored way of doing things.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Just to remind us, the two
statutory requirements are deception and a breach of fiduciary ob-
ligation. Incidentally, it is not entirely clear, at least not from the
opinion, whether there in fact was a fiduciary duty. A breach of
fiduciary duty is quite different and far weaker than deception,
which is what the statute requires.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: But, it is Chiarella that brings in this
breach of fiduciary duty concept. I was never all together happy,
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and I have always liked Judge Winter's dissent in the Chestman
opinion.
JUDGE WINTER: That was Cady that brought in the breach
of the fiduciary duty.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: Well, let's just say it was earlier
cases. I will give you a compliment even though you keep cor-
recting me. What I make out of your dissent is what you say about
the concept of fiduciary duty. You say we should let the federal
courts, in 10b-5 cases, act as common law judges. The rule that
you would have liked to adopt in your Chestman dissent is a rule
that is not tied to traditional concepts of fiduciary duty. Whereas
the majority opinion says that fiduciary duty is a well-defined ex-
isting concept and that they are going to stick to what it is and not
mess things up. It all goes back to something said by Professor
Karmel. Unfortunately, we are stuck with a single statute for both
civil and criminal cases, and we feel bound to give it the same in-
terpretation for both purposes. Maybe that is part of the source of
the problem. In a way, courts construing 10b-5 act as common law
courts. They make up the law, and this is problematic in a criminal
case. It is not problematic in a civil case.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Can I come at this question
of deception from a slightly different perspective, Marcel? The
court tells us that the trader can avoid committing deception or
triggering that element of the statute by telling the owner of the
information that he is about to use it for a securities trade, for a
trade. I think that is all. So, you do not even need to get the
owner's permission or consent. You do not need the retainer,
which is the sort of agreement that we were talking about before.
All you need to do is tell them that you are going to do it, and then
you can do it.
JUDGE WINTER: I disagree with that. I think the import of
the decision is that the owner of the information must acquiesce to
your use of it.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: The import of the decision?
JUDGE WINTER: Yes. In most employer-employee rela-
tionships or consultant relationships, the breach is the concealment
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and the act of using information that the owner does not want you
to use. So, I think you need both.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: I think this is both a perversion of
the original SEC conacept of the ban against trading on inside in-
formation and leads to why the misappropriation theory, although
probably necessary at this time because of the state of the law, is
not a very satisfactory theory from a law or policy perspective. If
you go back to the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the SEC's theory was
that persons who had the inside information either had to abstain
from trading or disclose the information, because this was informa-
tion that was material information that Texas Gulf, sooner or later,
was going to have to disclose. It seems to me that we have lost our
way in terms of why there ought to be a ban against trading on in-
side information. I think there ought to be a ban against trading
on inside information because the SEC, as a practical matter,
would be unable to enforce the disclosure obligations that various
persons in the securities markets have if there was not a ban
against trading on inside information before those disclosure obli-
gations are met.
One of the trade-offs that are made in this area is that the
SEC does not require instant disclosure of all material information
if there is no insider trading. The SEC and the courts have al-
lowed various people to wait until information is ripe for disclo-
sure, or until people are really sure of the facts, so long as nobody
is trading on information before it is disclosed. I think we have
just lost sight of the whole policy rationale for why there is this ban
and why investors would lose confidence if we allowed insider
trading. They would lose confidence because the whole disclosure
system would be destroyed if we did not have a ban against insider
trading. However, since the cases have developed in this common
law type of way and we have gone off on this tangent of the mis-
appropriation theory, everyone has forgotten why we have this
prohibition in the first place.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: But, if insider trading is tied to dis-
closure, then if you misappropriate from somebody who has no
disclosure obligations, then that should not be covered.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: I agree.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: So, you would come out against the
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misappropriation theory as long as you do not misappropriate
from a five percent stockholder?
PROFESSOR KARMEL: No. The vast majority of cases
that involve misappropriation of information that does not come
from an issuer who has a disclosure obligation with regard to that
information are tender offer cases. In tender offer cases, the dis-
closure obligation is really on the part of the bidder. If there is
going to be a tender offer, there is going to be a disclosure of that
tender offer and it is basically unfair for shareholders who are go-
ing to be granted a tender offer to sell before it is publicly an-
nounced. That is unfair. That is what can lead to a lack of investor
confidence. You are dealing with a situation where the securities
laws impose disclosure obligations on somebody. I think that, in
the cases where there is no disclosure obligation on anyone, like
the Carpenter case" involving the Wall Street Journal "Heard on
the Street" columns, or the Bryan case 26 involving the West Vir-
ginia Lottery, there is no need for trading to be in violation of the
federal securities laws. Maybe there are violations of some other
statute. The defendant in Bryan was violating all kinds of laws of
West Virginia. Why does this have to be a federal securities law
offense? I do not think that is necessary for the confidence of in-
vestors.
MR. MATHEWS: I think, Roberta, virtually all of the cases,
including O'Hagan', probably could have been prosecuted under
the mail and wire fraud statutes2 7 and you would not have the de-
fects that you will have by trying to squeeze them under Rule 10b-
5. The problem, once again, is the mixture of civil and criminal.
The reason it is important is because the SEC needs the interpreta-
tion to bring its civil cases and that has sort of bent the whole
criminal process.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: But, does this not turn things upside
down? If you are more skeptical of criminal prosecutions for these
kinds of actions than we are of civil prosecutions, then we should
be happy that they are 10b-5 violations because we do not have to
make the choice between criminal prosecution and no prosecution
whatsoever. We have the intermediate option of a civil proceed-
25 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
26 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).




MR. MATHEWS: Well, that policy argument might have
been okay until about ten years ago. A new provision was added
to Title 18 so that the Department of Justice can bring civil injunc-
tive actions for mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. 8
PROFESSOR KAHAN: Injunctive only?
MR. MATHEWS: Injunctive and they can get disgorgement
and get the money back. There is a procedure where you do not
need the SEC.
JUDGE WINTER: It is not only that. Wire and mail fraud
are a product of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO").29 So you can bring civil RICO actions.
MR. MATHEWS: The Securities Reform Act30 just took civil
RICO out of securities, mail, and wire fraud in private damage ac-
tions, but I guess it did not take it out of the Department of Justice
cases.
MR. KRAMER: Right.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Well, Justice Ginsburg has
a response to the critique about Art's main point, that this is a
criminal case, and it seems, given the uncertainty of what is pro-
hibited, to be a weak case. Justice Ginsburg's response is that this
rule has, as one of its elements, the scienter requirement that only
violations of some recognized duty will trigger criminal liability.
Does that not satisfy you, Art?
MR. MATHEWS: No. It does not satisfy me because even
the Supreme Court refuses to define what scienter is. Justice
Breyer threw that out during the oral argument. He thought that
the way you could get rid of the criminal jurisprudential argument
was by saying that it must be a willful violation in order to be
criminal, and, therefore, we can trust the government, which I do
not do, to exercise prosecutorial discretion and only go criminal in
28 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994 & Supp. 111998).
29 Id. § 1961.
30 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
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those really egregious cases where the conduct was clearly willful.
MR. KRAMER: So, which duties are recognized?
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Well, this is a nice prospec-
tive question. I mean, we have inherited this opinion, and the cir-
cuit courts and district courts will begin to work out the contours.
The question is how will those courts work out what is a recog-
nized duty? Will they turn to state-by-state interpretations of fi-
duciary obligation or will they develop a sort of federal common
law fiduciary duty for cases like this?
MR. KRAMER: Any relationship of trust and confidence
could conceivably satisfy this recognized duty, and nobody knows
what that means. You tell me.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Ginsburg stayed away from
that phrase. I think she used "fiduciary relationship."3 I do not
know if that helps any.
JUDGE WINTER: There is an aspect of O'Hagan that can
be developed. There is a Second Circuit case, Goldberg v. Meri-
dor,32 which holds that it violates 10(b) not to make a disclosure
that will alert someone that they were losing their state court
rights. It built on footnote fourteen in Santa Fe,33 where Justice
White, having stated throughout all of the text of the opinion that
we are not going to have anything to do with fiduciary duties, then
drops a footnote saying the respondents argued that the failure to
provide advance notice of the merger at issue was a material non-
disclosure and actionable under 10(b). However, Justice White
noted that we do not have to reach that issue because they could
not have gotten an injunction under state law. Then Goldberg
runs with this footnote and says that if you have a state court rem-
edy, then Santa Fe does not apply. Now, there is language in
O'Hagan that could be built on like that and that is the part where
Justice Ginsburg says that when you are breaching your fiduciary
obligation to the owner of the information, you have to disclose it
to the owner. That is like a Goldberg theory. That is another rea-
son why I think O'Hagan's implications for other areas of securi-
31 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2207,2211 (1997).
32 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
33 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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ties law are greater than its implications for insider trading.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Just by rereading all of the
circuit opinions you can see that it is hard to evaluate what fiduci-
ary-like duties qualify. It is hard to come up with a principle.
JUDGE WINTER: Well, under that theory, the Goldberg
theory, you would be looking to a particular state law. Whereas, if
it is a different kind of theory, then it would require a federal fidu-
ciary duty, which collides with Santa Fe, but O'Hagan collides all
over the place with Santa Fe.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: I would like to add that the way I
read O'Hagan, it does not take a fiduciary duty to misappropriate.
It takes fraud. Fraud can happen in two ways. First, if there is a
fiduciary duty to disclose and there is no disclosure. Second, in the
absence of a fiduciary duty, if you gain information by fraud and
then use it in trading, that is misappropriation.
JUDGE WINTER: Where was the fraud with O'Hagan? I
mean, the opinion says that he did not disclose but he did not have
an independent duty to disclose. There was no fraud there. There
is this federal law of fraud that is completely different from fraud
everywhere else. Under New York law, as I understand it, if you
have a breach of contract and the fiduciary obligations are contrac-
tual, you cannot plead fraud. It is a breach of contract. We have
this whole body of federal law in which breaches of duty become
fraud because you did not call up at one o'clock in the morning
and say, "I am about to breach my fiduciary obligation." It has
nothing to do with fraud or any traditional concept of fraud, as far
as I know.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: A lot of people on the panel have
voiced the argument that there is a very undefined law here and
we are sending people to jail. Does the argument not apply to the
same extent against mail and wire fraud? I do not really know
much about that law.




PROFESSOR KAHAN: Then O'Hagan, as it interprets 10b-
5, is really irrelevant to that argument.
JUDGE WINTER: That hobgoblin has gone to my small
mind.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: To my smaller mind as well.
JUDGE WINTER: In fact, that is even worse. You think
they are twisting 10(b)? With mail and wire fraud it is worse.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: The only difference is whether the
SEC can bring a civil action or not. I think that is much easier to
defend.
JUDGE WINTER: Well, Professor Kahan, I do not want to
disqualify what I said earlier about my concern with criminal
prosecutions. There is a tendency for all of us to talk about
whether we can do this or that as though there is some single hand
that is going to decide these things. I have seen a brief-I did not
sit on the case, but I have seen the brief-filed in the Second Cir-
cuit by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York (which at the time was known in Washington as
the Sovereign District of New York). I have seen a brief filed
saying that this criminal prosecution violated Department of Jus-
tice guidelines for enforcing RICO. It said that. Then it went on
to say that neither the courts nor the Southern District of New
York need to abide by the Department of Justice guidelines and
that they are wrong. This is the way the federal criminal law gets
enforced. There are dangers in reading things too broadly or
having these broad crimes because there are a lot of very idiosyn-
cratic prosecutorial decisions that are made, and when they start
chasing somebody, they will look for every conceivable law
around.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: Fortunately, some of these prosecu-
tors go into politics.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: In my experience watching securi-
ties law prosecutions over what is now a long period of time, there
are fashions in criminal prosecutions like in other things. There
was some mention made that there was not a criminal prosecution
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of insider trading until the 1970s. Then, I think Professor Kahan
said that this is what is needed because you can make so much
money on insider trading and there are not that many prosecutions
of older parts of the federal securities laws. I can remember when
there were no prosecutions of insider trading and people were
prosecuted for violating the margin regulations, but later on the
Federal Reserve Board said, "What do we need these for? We
should abolish these regulations." I guess I do not have the trust
in prosecutorial discretion that you have. Maybe that is because I
started my legal career as an SEC enforcement attorney and I re-
alize how quirky these prosecutorial decisions can be.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Do you agree that what
James O'Hagan did in this case was undesirable trading?
PROFESSOR KARMEL: Absolutely. I think that what he
did should be illegal. I think that what he did probably should be a
criminal offense as well as a civil offense, but I do not think that
the law reached this result in an appropriate way.
MR. MATHEWS: But it did not need to use 10b-5. By the
way, I will make a disclosure. I represented O'Hagan in the SEC
investigation. I wrote the so-called "Wells Submission" and al-
most got him off, but the SEC discovered that he had stolen the
money from the Mayo Clinic. The reason why he was engaged in
the trading was that he was trying to pay the money back to the
trust funds from which he had taken the money. My point is that
he did not have to be prosecuted under 10b-5. He went to jail un-
der state law crimes and served time in the state penitentiary. Un-
der my analysis, he clearly was guilty of a Rule 14e-3 crime. So, he
would go to jail on that. You did not need to pile 10b-5 on some-
body who is already going to do jail time under much more tradi-
tional statutes that clearly fit the crimes.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: I had better make a disclosure
here too. I was a commissioner when 14e-3 was going through the
system. There is no question that the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 to
get around the Chiarella decision in the tender offer area and that
it was clearly intended to cover this kind of activity. I think that a
lot of people thought when the Supreme Court took this case that
they were going to reverse the circuit court on 14e-3 and do noth-




MR. MATHEWS: I might mention, if I can change the sub-
ject for a second, that no opinion is all black and white. We, in the
defense bar, do find some solace in the O'Hagan decision that will
help us defend some insider trading cases. Bill McLucas, the Di-
rector of Enforcement, has publicly acknowledged that there is
one issue that bothers the SEC about Ginsburg's opinion. What
bothers him is that the opinion specifically talks about trading on
the basis of material and non-public information, rather than while
in possession of material and non-public information.
I tried a criminal insider trading case in Maryland about seven
years ago. I represented a chief financial officer who was indicted
for selling a big chunk of his stock in the issuer three weeks before
he had to make an announcement that the company had its first
quarterly loss in history. We defended the case on the grounds
that he did not trade on the basis of information that he knew the
company was going to announce a loss but that he traded because
he had expert analysis of his portfolio completed by an outside in-
vestment advisor who had written a fifty page report which
strongly urged him to sell X percent of his stock to diversify, which
he did. So, our argument was that even though he may have come
into possession of adverse information he did not trade on the ba-
sis of it. The government argued strongly against it. I asked for
the jury charge "on the basis of" rather than "in possession of" and
the government asked for a one-day recess so that they could get
the SEC General Counsel's office to come in the next day to argue
against me on the jury charge. The SEC argued their traditional
Texas Gulf Sulphur of disclose or abstain and all that you have to
do is be "in possession of" and that you do not have to trade "on
the basis of." Fortuitously, in my rebuttal argument, I just hap-
pened to look down at the indictment and noticed that they im-
plied in the indictment that the stock was traded "on the basis of"
and not "while in possession of." So, I got my jury charge anyway
because that was what the indictment said.
This is an issue that bothers the SEC because there are a lot of
cases where alleged insider traders defend on the grounds that
they traded for other legitimate reasons. It will be interesting to
see what the courts will do with the battle between "on the basis
of" and "in possession of."
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, Art. That was
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excellent. I am glad there is some good news in the O'Hagan
opinion. Well, we know pretty well how the wind is blowing up
here on the panel. Perhaps, now, we can invite the audience to
join in the questioning. There is Richard Painter.
MR. PAINTER: We have an opinion that specifically stated
that what he did wrong was to disclose the source of his informa-
tion and that he was going to trade on the information. The opin-
ion specifically pointed out that if he had disclosed the source of
the information to his law firm and his client, then the remedies
against him would be under state law and not under section 10(b).
In other words, he need only tell his client the source of the infor-
mation if he was going to trade.
Second, on oral argument the government's attorney was
asked, "What if somebody sold the briefcase of the lawyer and
traded on the information? Would that violate 10(b) under mis-
appropriation?" The answer from the government was "No."
What kind of theory have we been using to convict insider traders?
Yes, these may be situations that are not likely to grow often, but
does this theory merge with respect to the law. Does this make
sense, or should we send it back to Congress?
MR. MATHEWS: But, do you not think, Richard, that Mike
Dreban did a terrific job on the law in that? I happen to think that
one of the reasons why the government won the case was because
of Mike Dreban's oral argument. Do you not think that judges in-
terpreting the O'Hagan decision will hold that if the trader steals
the briefcase from the lawyer and uses the information in it that he
has misappropriated it and that it will be a 10b-5 violation?
MR. PAINTER: Well, they may.
MR. MATHEWS: I think they will.
JUDGE WINTER: I think they will too.
MR. PAINTER: The other thing is that there needs to be a
failure to disclose. What they are trying to do is fit the misappro-
priation theory into Santa Fe. So we need to find a failure to dis-
close. Mere breach of a fiduciary duty will not do it. But, there
has to be a failure to disclose.
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MR. MATHEWS: But I did not disclose that I stole your
briefcase before I traded.
MR. PAINTER: Is stealing a failure to disclose, or is it more
of a breach of fiduciary duty? They are going to have to try and
figure that one out. But, for one reason or another, the govern-
ment's own oral argument concedes this point to Justice
O'Connor. Yet, she signed on the majority opinion. This is where
I have a problem.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: There is Lawrence Rosen-
bloom.
MR. ROSENBLOOM: Am I correct that Justice Ginsburg
says that the civil cases are not really appropriate, nor applicable,
in the criminal cases like O'Hagan. I think she does say that.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The question I had was are we
really talking about misappropriation and insider trading, or are
we talking about interpretations of the statute and the role of the
Supreme Court of the United States? The problem I have with it,
as a student at Pace University, is in Central Bank,34 where great
emphasis was put on strict interpretation of the statute as the only
index of being able to interpret securities law. So, if we align our-
selves with Central Bank, forgetting about, for the moment, insider
trading with the stolen briefcase, then how do we rationalize
O'Hagan? Or, if we are going to use O'Hagan as the standard for
an expansive interpretation of the statute, then how do we ration-
alize Central Bank?
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes, Justice Ginsburg did
struggle with that problem, as Professor Karmel said, and she in-
herited a tough jurisprudence. She did make the effort to show the
way in which this activity constituted deception, which was not an
easy task to mount, as Dan Kramer has said.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: I have a different answer. You
can reconcile O'Hagan with a lot of cases that were decided before
34 Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1944).
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1975, when the Supreme Court started on a strict interpretation of
10b-5 with Blue Chip Stamps.35 Most of those cases were dropped
out of the case books as no longer relevant. I do not know.
Maybe now they will be revived and brought back. But, there are
a lot of pre-1975 cases giving very expansive interpretations to
10b-5. So, I think you are correct that the Supreme Court can be
questioned or criticized for having cases interpreting 10b-5 that
start from very different premises and sometimes apply 10b-5 or
interpret 10b-5 very broadly and other times interpret it very nar-
rowly.
MR. KRAMER: Yes. I have to agree with the sense of the
question which is that it is very difficult to understand that the
same court that could write Central Bank could also write
O'Hagan. They are starting from very different places and very
different notions of what the. law is and how statutes should be in-
terpreted. Ultimately, it is just not reconcilable.
MR. MATHEWS: Well, it is just that bad facts make bad law.
MR. KRAMER: Right.
JUDGE WINTER: The problem, again, is not O'Hagan.
You could say the same thing about Chiarella and Dirks.
MR. KRAMER: Right.
JUDGE WINTER: You have two rationales. One is the
misuse of information, and the other is unfairness in trading with
other people. I do not think they ever should have been joined. If
some fiduciary is misusing information, that is wrong. What dif-
ference does it make whether they trade or however they do it. If
it is wrong to trade with somebody who has less information than
you, what difference does it make to that person whether you stole
the information or you are a genius? The truth is they never
should have been put together. Once Chiarella separated them the
answer should have been, now that we have separated them and
we have nothing but misuse of information this has nothing to do
with 10(b) whatsoever. But, you have to go back to Chiarella and
look at its favorable citations of Cady. It is amazing. I mean, it
35 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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rejects one of the two major premises of Cady without every say-
ing so, but that is where they went wrong. This is not O'Hagan. I
do not know what she was supposed to do. Presumably she could
not get the six votes to overrule Dirks and Chiarella.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes, sir?
PROFESSOR TIESON: I am Professor Tieson from the
University of Pennsylvania. Usually, what we like to disclose is
corporate information coming in from the world, or market infor-
mation about tender offers. Justice Ginsburg is saying that what
we want to disclose, and what we are required to disclose, is that
we have breached our fiduciary duty. How does that further the
purposes of the federal securities laws? Also, Justice Burger, in
Chiarella, said what he felt was misappropriation theory and did
not say that disclosure had to be the source of the information. He
said it had to be public disclosure. If the misappropriation theory
said that, then it would make some sense.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes, right. Also, Justice
Ginsburg observed that Burger had dealt with it in terms of dis-
closing to the public and then she changed that piece of it.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: I am not sure that this is an entirely
fair reading of what Burger did. Burger does talk about misap-
propriating and stealing. Presumably, if you get the consent of the
person from whom you misappropriate or steal, then it is no longer
misappropriating or stealing. So, I think Burger may not have
been satisfied with disclosure to the source of information. But I
think he would have been satisfied with consent or with public dis-
closure.
PROFESSOR TIESON: He is saying that you must disclose
publicly that a tender offer is going to be made.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: If you have misappropriated and if
you publicize the information, then you are no longer violating
10b-5. But I think, if you get the consent of the person who owns
the information, then you do not need to publicize it.
PROFESSOR TIESON: I will make the distinction between
public disclosure and disclosing to one person who already knows
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the information. The bidder knows that the tender offer is going
to be made. So, you are not disclosing that the tender offer is go-
ing to be made. You are simply disclosing to them and then you sit
on it. How does this further the purpose of securities laws?
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Maybe the answer is that,
once such a person gets that consent, he is no longer an outsider
but is an insider and is subject to the classical prohibitions.
PROFESSOR TIESON: I think Mr. Matthews is wrong, and
the decision does not require consent. The decision does not say
you have to get consent. You just have to tell them you are steal-
ing it, and then, you trade and you have already won.
MR. KRAMER: Then, the decision talks about the remedies
that the source of the information would have. I think it implies
that there is no consent, since the court goes further and says that
if you do not like what this person is doing, the source of informa-
tion may then be able to obtain injunctive relief and have other
state law remedies.
MR. MATHEWS: I was blurring the state law remedies.
PROFESSOR KAHAN: It is not going to happen all that of-
ten. That is not a consolation for Richard. But, I think it is rele-
vant.
MR. MATHEWS: The thing that bothers me is whether we
are going to have the courts now developing a body of federal
common law of traditional state law fiduciary duties. I mean, I
have had so many cases where it is the wife who learns from the
husband, and then tells the brother-in-law, and the brother-in-law
trades. Or, the kid is eavesdropping on the phone and the kid
trades. You have all of these cases and you are going to have fed-
eral courts interpreting all of these duties as to when it is or is not a
fiduciary duty. I mean, it is nuts.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: And they are going to.
JUDGE WINTER: We have to look at this as part of a larger
context. Under the mail and wire fraud statutes, the federal courts
have been developing federal breaches of fiduciary duty, including
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in the corporate context. There is an obligation to disclose to the
shareholders.
MR. MATTHEWS: I agree with Jack Coffee in his article
From Tort to Crime,36 that the courts were making crimes out of
things that were just ordinary state law.
JUDGE WINTER: You have to view O'Hagan in this con-
text. This is something the federal courts have been doing for
three or four decades.
MR. MATTHEWS: Decades. You are right.
JUDGE WINTER: Whatever it is that is behind this is cul-
tural and something that is difficult to explain. I heard Abe Gold-
stein, a Professor at Yale Law School, once say that he just
thought that judges look at white-collar criminals and say, "they
are our class." They will provide a lot less in the way of notice and
other kinds of protection than they would to your ordinary bank
robber.
MR. MATTHEWS: Judge, at other times it is the Supreme
Court that has stepped up to the plate. Take the intangible rights
statute or the mail fraud statute. For twenty-five years, eleven of
the eleven circuits had condoned mail fraud prosecutions on the
intangible rights theory and then the Supreme Court, in McNally,37
threw it all out, nine zip, and said that they did not care that every
circuit court has approved it for twenty-five years, because it is
wrong.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: A question from this side.
Sir?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There seems to be some animosity
from some of the panel members towards the Supreme Court for
interpreting 10b-5 and including the criminal aspect. If Congress
does not like all of this change, then Congress can change it. Why
is the panel so concerned? If Congress does not change it, you can
36 John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 117 (1981).
37 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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leave it the way it is.
MR. MATHEWS: That is a good point, practically. How-
ever, jurisprudentially, I think it is dangerous to let courts create
crimes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If Congress knew that it was a
travesty, they would act on it. And until then, we should take the
decision as is.
MR. KRAMER: In my view, that is a very undemocratic no-
tion. I am not sure that I ascribe to the theory that if judges feel
that Congress has not acted appropriately, then they will step in
and wait for Congress to correct them. I think that is just undemo-
cratic.
MR. MATHEWS: Well, as Roberta Karmel said, this is an
area that Congress has specifically addressed. Congress had
hearings trying to define insider trading and decided that they
could not come to an agreement and that they would not do it be-
cause the SEC came up to Congress and said, "Please don't do it.
We don't want you to do it."
JUDGE WINTER: Yes, but in his defense, the same Con-
gress that said, "We are not going to define it," also said "You can
get treble damages and attorneys' fees."
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Let's try to take three more
questions before we break. Depending on their length, we may
only have time for two. Professor Fish, from Fordham, is in the
back of the room.
PROFESSOR FISH: Just to sort of add to that. Congress
said, as part of its findings, which was enacted in the 1980 legisla-
tion, that the insider trading that the courts developed was appro-
priate. Congress thought it was a good idea.
MR. MATTHEWS: That was not Congress. That was just a
couple of members of Congress.
PROFESSOR FISH: Those were the findings. That is not




PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Yes, sir?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was wondering if either of the
panelists had a proposed definition of insider trading?
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Well, Art?
MR. KRAMER: In 1988, the SEC and the ABA, together,
proposed a definition of insider trading. The SEC itself, at a point
when I think it was feeling a little bit more vulnerable than it does
today, actually proposed the definition that the ABA also signed.
MR. MATHEWS: The SEC appointed a committee. The
committee was headed by Ted Levine, Harvey Pith, and John Al-
ston, who were three prominent practitioners. They came up with
what a lot of us in the bar thought was a pretty good definition.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: Interestingly, the reason the SEC
then ended up opposing the enactment of a definition had to do
with a dispute over whether possession of inside information suf-
ficed for this wrong, or whether there had to be use. I think it is
very ironic that Justice Ginsburg sided with the private bar on this
issue with her "on-the-basis-of" language. I think, if the SEC
knew that was the way the law was going to come out, the SEC
might have gone along with a statutory definition of insider trad-
ing. So, I do not think this idea that the misappropriation theory
was valid is really in the statute. I think it is in the committee re-
ports and the committee reports are generally written by the SEC.
Therefore, I do not know how much weight ought to be given to
them.
JUDGE WINTER: Can I answer, since it was directed at me.
It is a serious question. My answer, I think, is that the misuse of
information should be dealt with in a body of law dealing with the
misuse of information. We should not try to separate out misuse
of information that is then used to make money on the stock mar-
ket. So, I would not define insider trading. I totally agree with
Professor Kahan in all of these cases. I think something that ought
to be illegal was done. But, I think it is part of a different body of
law because it also happens to be my view that insider trading does
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not affect the integrity or honesty of markets. If you look at
nothing but the fact that someone has good information, we want
that person to trade. That is what makes the efficient market hy-
pothesis work. That is how we price securities. People who have
the best information set the prices. So, what is wrong with insider
trading is the misuse of somebody else's information. The issue is
not whether they use it to trade.
PROFESSOR CUNNINGHAM: Well, actually, I may
breach the promise that I made about three questions. We have
run out of time, but I want to thank all of the panelists and all of
you for coming, as well as Marcy Rosenbaum and the Law Review
for helping out. Thank you all very much.

